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Abstract
Internet growth has allowed unprecedented widespread access to cultural cre-
ation including music and ﬁlms, to knowledge, and to a wide range of consumer
information. At the same time, it has become a huge source of business oppor-
tunities. Along with great beneﬁts that this access to the Internet provides, the
open and free access to the Internet has encountered large opposition based on
political, economical and ethical reasons. An ongoing battle over the control on
Internet access has been escalating on all these fronts. In this paper we describe
ﬁrst some of the ideological roots of free access to the Internet along with its
main opponents. We then focus on the problem of Internet piracy and analyze
the eﬃciency of eﬀorts to reduce the availability of copyrighted creations that
are available for non-authorized free download.
Keywords: Internet access, fundamental rights, copyrights, public goods,
commons
1. Introduction
As technology allows very high speed access to the Internet for hundreds of
millions of people around the world, the pervasive nature of the Internet draws
growing opposition. Those who try to restrict, to control or to ﬁlter access to
the Internet include a wide variety of actors motivated by quite diﬀerent rea-
sons ranging from security to political and ideological ones, as well as economic
interests
This work has been triggered by an ongoing legislation battle in France
between two opposed approaches for dealing with copyright infringements over
the Internet and with non-authorized download of copyrighted content. One
approach proposes to ban such downloads and to establish a heavy control on
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downloads, while the other proposes to establish a general tax on internauts that
wish to pursue downloading. The revenues of the tax would be redistributed
among the copyright owners.
The HADOPI law can be associated with two basic types of restrictions
of the access to the Internet. First, there is a legal limit, that in absence of
this law would not be clearly deﬁned, over the content that can be accessed
and downloaded through the Internet. Second, there is also the suspension
of the Internet access service that the law imposes as part of the sanctions
against unauthorized ﬁle sharing by an Internet subscriber. Other countries
have implemented diﬀerent types of access restrictions like, for example, blocking
access to P2P sites, throttling the traﬃc of P2P users and blocking the use of
P2P ﬁle sharing protocols.
The French constitutional Court has rejected some aspects of the original
HADOPI Act citing the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789,
which dates back to more than two centuries before the Internet. This link may
have come as a surprise to many of those involved in developing and deploying
the Internet, who may not be aware of what the Internet represents for society
beyond its technological revolutionary features and characteristics.
The ﬁrst part of this paper examines the ideological and legal role of Internet
access. We begin by recalling in the next section several historical human rights
declarations that had later an impact on legislation concerning Internet access.
We then present, in the following section, an overview of legislation and rulings
concerning Internet access which refer to these declarations. In the second part
of the paper we present a socio-economic vision of the role of the Internet. In
Section 4, we examine its identiﬁcation as a public good, and address the
classical issues related to public goods: that of free riders and of provisioning.
We then present an overview of work on the role of the Internet access as a
commons and address, in particular, the role of wireless access to the Internet.
We end the paper with a section that proposes some recommendations on the
future of the Internet.
2. Human Right Declarations
There are three important documents in the history of human rights: the
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 17764, the United States Declaration of Inde-
pendence of 1776, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
of 17895. Whether these texts originated independently, or, on the other hand,
were mutually inﬂuenced by each other, is a doctrinal discussion in the ﬁeld of
4The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) was the model used for the Bill of Rights by
other states of the American Union.
5The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 is considered the ﬁrst form
of recognition of individual rights and liberties in a legal instrument of any European country
[46, p. 121].
2
law [35]. What is indisputable is that the ideas of the rational natural school6
are present in these declarations:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state
of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their pos-
terity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety is found in the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness states the United States Dec-
laration of Independence.
Men are born and remain free and equal in rights said thirteen
years later the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.
Since then, life, liberty and equality were recognized in successive western con-
stitutional texts as fundamental rights of every human being. Both, French and
American constitutional texts consecrate the principles considered in the decla-
rations, albeit in diﬀerent ways7. Worldwide recognition of these principles was
achieved with the ﬁrst article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
3. Recognition of Internet access as a fundamental right
Freedom has many manifestations, e.g., freedom of expression and opinion,
freedom of press, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of com-
munication. All these forms in which freedom is manifested, in turn require
guarantees to assure its exercise in all areas, regardless of frontiers and by any
means of expression8.
Several explicit links between human rights and Internet access have ap-
peared in the last years. The European Parliament [22] believes that the Inter-
net is a universal space that now allows the pursuit of all these manifestations
6Grocio, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Pufendorf, Leibniz, Tomasio, Rousseau and Kant are
considered the most representative philosophers of the XVII, XVIII and XIX centuries, who
developed the natural law theory based on reason [7].
7The French throughout in the preamble, while the Americans, on the other hand, through
amendments.
8Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reminds all States that freedom
of speech includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. In the same
line, Article 19.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares that
[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally,
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
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of freedom as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on the Rights Civil and Political Rights, becoming the
most versatile tool for the exercise of freedom of expression globally. To that ex-
tent, the Internet should not be subjected to interference by public authority9,
or limitation of access or control of content. The Spanish Senate recognized that
all people have a fundamental right to access the Internet, without any discrim-
ination. As freedom is an inherent condition to the Internet, it admitted the
principle that no power can restrict this freedom and that its limits can only
come from the Declaration of Human Rights10.
Internet access in the European Union is seen as a universal service, i.e.,
one that must be provided by Member States at the quality speciﬁed to all
end-users in their territory, independently of geographical location, and, in the
light of speciﬁc national conditions, at an aﬀordable price [26, Art. 3]. Fixed
location services have to be capable of "data rates that are suﬃcient to permit
functional Internet access, taking into account prevailing technologies used by
the majority of subscribers and technological feasibility" ([26, Art. 4] replaced
by [28, Art. 1.3]). Expanding on this same line, the Ministry of Transport
and Communication of Finland has passed a Decree in October 2009 on the
caracteristics that the access to Internet, as a universal service, should have [40].
In it, the Ministry demands from providers that ﬁxed broadband connections
should be ensured with an average rate of at least one Mbps and that by 2015
a 100 Mbps backbone is within 2 Km of every permanent connection.
Internet's administrative intervention in the European Union was one of the
most controversial issues in discussions on the reform of the so called Telecom11
package. It was expected that the European Parliament would promote leg-
islative measures aimed at strengthening Internet end-user's fundamental rights
and freedoms, keeping Amendment 138 as proposed:
that no restriction may be imposed on the fundamental rights
and freedoms of end-users, without a prior ruling by the judicial
authorities, notably in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union on freedom of expression
and information, save when public security is threatened where the
ruling may be subsequent.
This proposition, supported several times by the European Parliament [27], [21],
[23], [22], was amended at the eleventh hour of the discussions of the Telecom
package, as keeping it without change went beyond the competence of the
Community as laid down in Article 95 of the EC Treaty.12
9See Art. 10.1 [29]
10See Spanish Senate diary of sessions of 9 December, 1999 at http://www.senado.es/
comredinf/ds/index.html
11The set of directives governing telecommunications in the European Union, whose recent
amendments have been incorporated in the Directive 2009/136/CE.
12See the document A7-0070/2009 of European Parlament available in
http://www.europarl.europa.eu
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This new position, which was included in the Directive 2009/136/CE [28,
Art. 1.3], opens the door to the intervention of Internet communications through
administrative procedures, although it calls for respect of fundamental rights
and freedoms, as well as due process guarantees:
Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and
in the interests of the Community, their own tables illustrating, as
far as possible, national measures regarding end-users' access to, or
use of, services and applications through electronic communications
networks, shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of nat-
ural persons, including in relation to privacy and due process, as
deﬁned in Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The ﬁrst amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits Congress to
pass laws that abridge the freedom of speech or press. Nonetheless, in 1996 the
USA Congress approved the Communications Decency Act (CDA) to protect
minors from indecent and patently oﬀensive communications that an inter-
national network of interconnected computers that enables millions of people
to communicate with one another in 'cyberspace' and to access vast amounts
of information from around the world, allows [54]. This form of censorship of
the freedom of speech was alerted by the American Civil Rights Union (ACLU)
who ﬁled a civil action against the CDA. The decision of the special three-judge
panel in ACLU, et al. v. Reno [60] was favorable to freedom of speech, as it
stated that:
the Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide
conversation. Government may not, through the CDA, interrupt
that conversation. As the most participatory form of mass speech
yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest protection from gov-
ernmental intrusion.
Furthermore, this Court said that parents:
can install blocking software on their home computers, or they
can subscribe to commercial online services that provide parental
controls. It is quite clear that powerful market forces are at work
to expand parental options to deal with these legitimate concerns.
More fundamentally, parents can supervise their children's use of the
Internet or deny their children the opportunity to participate in the
medium until they reach an appropriate age.
It is interesting what judge Dalzell explains before concluding that the CDA
was unconstitutional:
Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of
our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered
speech the First Amendment protects. The Internet and other online
computer networks merit the highest protection from governmental
intrusion.
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Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court judgment and the CDA was
deemed unconstitutional:
The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a demo-
cratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven beneﬁt of cen-
sorship [54].
The CDA was followed by the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which was
called Congress Decency Act II by its critics, a scathing reference to their
common goal. The Act sought the restriction of access by minors to mate-
rials commercially distributed by means of world wide web that are harmful
to minors. The term material that is harmful to minors, whose commercial
distribution entailed criminal sanctions, means any communication, picture, im-
age, graphic image ﬁle, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind
that is obscene or that:
(a) the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, would ﬁnd, taking the material as a whole and with respect
to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the
prurient interest;
(b) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently oﬀen-
sive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or
sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual
act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female
breast; and
(c) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientiﬁc value for minors. [55, Apendix A]
The COPA, like the CDA, reached the Supreme Court [55] who this time did
not rule on its constitutionality, limiting its decision to:
hold only that COPA's reliance on community standards to iden-
tify `material that is harmful to minors' does not by itself render the
statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amend-
ment. We do not express any view as to whether COPA suﬀers from
substantial overbreadth for other reasons, whether the statute is un-
constitutionally vague, or whether the District Court correctly con-
cluded that the statute likely will not survive strict scrutiny analysis
once adjudication of the case is completed below. While respondents
urge us to resolve these questions at this time, prudence dictates al-
lowing the Court of Appeals to ﬁrst examine these diﬃcult issues.
The case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals [59] who stated that the COPA
was unconstitutional:
to avoid liability under COPA, aﬀected Web publishers would
either need to severely censor their publications or implement an age
or credit card veriﬁcation system whereby any material that might
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be deemed harmful by the most puritan of communities in any state
is shielded behind such a veriﬁcation system. Shielding such vast
amounts of material behind veriﬁcation systems would prevent ac-
cess to protected material by any adult seventeen or over without
the necessary age veriﬁcation credentials. Moreover, it would com-
pletely bar access to those materials to all minors under seventeen 
even if the material would not otherwise have been deemed `harmful'
to them in their respective geographic communities.
In France, things have not been very diﬀerent. With the HADOPI Act, which by
means of an administrative procedure orders the disconnection of P2P users that
share copyrighted cultural contents, the Constitutional Council went back to the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen to conclude that the freedom
of speech could not be trusted to a new nonjudicial authority in order to protect
holders of copyrights and neighbouring rights, as the free communication of
ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man [14]. The
Council recognizes that Internet is a powerful tool in the exercise of the freedom
of speech and this is why only a court of law -as guardian of freedom- can restrict
access to it. Therefore, Internet access acquires the level of a fundamental right.
The response of the Executive against the Constitutional Council's decision
was almost immediate. Less than ﬁfteen days were enough to present a criminal
bill (HADOPI II Act) to the Senate [39], in order to complete the mechanism
of graduated response of the HADOPI Act. Copyrighted content ﬁle-sharing
becomes a form of piracy, a criminal oﬀense that can only be declared by a
court of law, theoretically solving the questions posed by the Council. Hence,
after the warnings have been submitted to the infringer, the case is brought to
a criminal court that might sentence him with the suspension of Internet access
for up to a year and a ban on signing a new contract.
In summary, we witness a wide scale recognition of the Internet access as a
basic human right. This view will certainly have a great impact on the Internet
of the future. However, there is an ongoing struggle on the extent of Internet
access and of measures to control it that may have a huge impact on tomorrow's
Internet, a struggle between a confrontational approach, aiming at banning
physical access to copyrighted content on the Internet 13 and on the other, an
approach aiming at taxing such access.
13The secretive way with which the USA, EU, Mexico, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Aus-
tralia and other countries have been negotiating an agreement to implement a worldwide
HADOPI-like model is a clear example of a strategy aiming at controlling the Internet.
For more information see Michael Geist's report in http://www.michaelgeist.ca/, and La
Quadratura du Net coverage in http://www.laquadrature.net/acta. The European Parlia-
ment has also expressed in a resolution [24] its concern over the lack of a transparent process
in the conduct of the ACTA negotiations, a state of aﬀairs at odds with the letter and spirit
of the TFEU; is deeply concerned that no legal base was established before the start of the
ACTA negotiations and that parliamentary approval for the negotiating mandate was not
sought.
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4. Cultural resources in Internet as a public good
4.1. Public goods
In the economic literature [50] a public good is deﬁned as a good that is
non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalrous because the consumption of
the good by one user will not leave less of the resource for the remaining users.
Non-excludable because the consumption of the good doesn't exclude other
users from simultaneously consuming it. In this sense, the good is public not
because it is produced by a public entity, but because its consumption is publicly
available.
Cultural contents share these characteristics, meaning they can be seen as
public goods. But the Legislator has created, with copyrights, artiﬁcial means
to limit access to them. The reproduction of cultural contents has been the
main monopoly on which the cultural contents production industry (CPI) has
based its revenue. If everybody could copy cultural contents without paying
compensations to the CPI, the industry and the authors would be put in an
impasse.
4.2. The free rider problem
Olson [42] thought that people would become active in promoting a common
interest only if the group is small or they are forced to do it. Otherwise, they
would only act according to their individual interests, even if that impairs the
common goal. This selﬁsh individual, the free rider, will not feel obliged to
contribute voluntarily to the provision of the common good once it has been
produced, as he cannot be excluded from reaping the beneﬁts. At the heart
of every collective action model, Ostrom [43] says, lies the problem of the free
rider.
In the ﬁle sharing context, P2P users are seen as free riders by the CPI, as
they can acquire cultural contents they like without paying for them. Thus,
economic compensation can be equated to some sort of provisioning of the pub-
lic good, as authors, performers and the CPI contribute with cultural contents,
but users of P2P networks have no other way to do it. Interestingly, among en-
gineers and researchers who develop P2P protocols, a free rider has the opposite
meaning: it is someone who does not share with others the ﬁles he has.
4.3. Provision of the public good
The reproduction of copyrighted cultural contents in any manner or form
[66, Art. 9.1] is an exclusive right granted to authors, performers and producers
of cultural contents, as well as broadcasting organizations [66, 70, 68, 67, 25].
This means that to reproduce a work protected by copyright laws, the autho-
rization from rightholders should be obtained. However, this right may have
some exceptions in special cases, provided that the reproduction does not con-
ﬂict with the normal exploitation of the work or that the exemption causes
unreasonable prejudice to the copyright holders interests [66, Art. 9.2], [70,
Art. 13], [68, Art. 16.2]. Within the framework of the European Union and
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with the aim of harmonizing the rules on copyright in the member States, a
common scheme of legal limitations or exceptions regarding the reproduction
of cultural contents is incorporated in the directive 29/2001/CE, allowing the
development and smooth functioning of the cultural industries. Thus, we ﬁnd
in the European economic context the enforceability of a fair compensation14
to those, who for private use, reproduce copyrighted works15.
Two schemes of compensation can be seen in diﬀerent legislations throughout
the world; we describe these in the two following subsections. We also describe
YouTube's initiative as a way for the private initiative to provide for the public
good.
4.3.1. The private copying levy on recordable media, reproduction equipment
and Internet access
The private copy levy is a compensation mechanism that is established on
analog and digital devices that allow unauthorized copying of cultural contents.
This tax is based on the idea of uncontrolled future events that the use of such
equipment may trigger in the economic exploitation of cultural works16.
The levy may depend on the ability to copy that the device allows [49]. The
distribution of revenue collected may depend on a law or on a contract subject
to the supervision of a public authority17
The indiscriminate way by which the levy is usually applied, has been the
key rebuttal argument by consumer associations [3], [57], since in many cases
those who acquire the cultural content, do not intend to copy or, actually, make
copies of it, and the consumer who buys blank media does it not necessarily
with the intent of copying copyrighted works.
The possibility of applying this levy on the Internet connections is a solution
to the ﬁle sharing issue that has not been entirely abandoned in the public
debate. We believe that the European Legislator [25, Recital 35] wanted to avoid
that consumers incur a double payment of the levy, and hence it is established
only as an exception to the exclusive right of reproduction that the rightholders
have on their works18.
The establishment of a levy on the connection may also lead Internet users
to assume that they have acquired a legitimate right of reproduction, rather
than an obligation to compensate, on the works they have downloaded through
the Internet.
14For more information see [20]
15On the other hand, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta do not
provide compensation for private copying in their legislations.
16The damage claimed by the CPI is based on the idea that every "single" or CD not sold
is due to the acquisition of a copy. However, it is not clear that anyone who is not allowed to
get a copy of a cultural content is going to replace it by buying the original.
17To know more on the distribution mechanism see [19, pp. 35].
18The ADSL connection is merely a connection, not a reproduction equipment, thus it
cannot lead to any private copy levy [48].
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4.3.2. Blanket license
An alternative legislative approach to restricting access has been to impose
taxes on Internet access. Who would pay the tax? Several proposals have been
considered: (i) all subscribers to the Internet access, (ii) all subscribers to high
bandwidth access, (iii) all subscribers except those who declare they will not
download unauthorized ﬁles.
In France, in the National Assembly debates on the
DADVSI19 Act, an amendment to the Intellectual Property Code that promoted
the creation of an Optional Blanket License (OBL) to legalize noncommercial
ﬁle-sharing of cultural contents protected by copyright and compensate their
rightholders, was proposed.
This OBL20 was essentially an authorization granted by the authors to In-
ternet users for unlimited access to their work, in exchange for a ﬂat monthly
payment21 made as compensation. This compensation would have been col-
lected by the ISPs and collectively managed.
The proposal did not ﬁnd support among the CPI and was eventually re-
jected by the French parliament arguing that it beneﬁted neither the creators
nor the consumers, because:
1. The ISPs would have been forced to implement surveillance measures on
the network22.
2. The license would have increased the subscription price of Internet ac-
cess23.
3. It did not respect the chronology of the media24. By contrast, in European
countries like UK, Spain, Denmark, Italy, Serbia and Lithuania, there are
no laws that guarantee a chronology [36].
4. There was no viable proposition for the distribution of revenue collected25.
19The Loi sur le Droit d'Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l'Information (Loi
Nro. 2006-961 du 1er Août), was drafted to transpose EU directive 2001/29/CE into French
law.
20Supported by more than 14,000 authors, performers, producers, designers, photographers
and consumers of L'Alliance Public-Artistes. See http://www.lalliance.org/pages/1_1.
html.
21Between 5 to 7 Euros.
22The OBL posed a tragedy of the commons [33], as the lack of control mechanisms gives
no incentive to pay the license. See Subsection 5.1.
23If no surveillance measures are implemented, the license should be compulsory, with the
increased price of subscription service a logical consequence.
24The chronology of the media is a protectionist measure designed to ensure the economic
development of the domestic ﬁlm industry versus the foreign one. The aim of the measure
is to establish a schedule -after the premiere in cinemas- for dissemination of ﬁlm in other
media. Mandatory minimum periods have to be completed before moving ﬁlms from cinemas
to home video (DVD, Blu-ray disc), and from it to television broadcasts. In France, an
agreement has been recently signed to adjust the chronology of the media (see Arrêté du 9
juillet 2009 pris en application de l'article 30-7 du code de l'industrie cinématographique,
NOR: MCCK0916018A).
25The fact that the blanket license involved a distribution of income based on a represen-
tative sample of works downloaded through the P2P networks with no correlation with the
market reality, was questioned.
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However, a group of parliament members were reluctant to abandon the idea
that, in France, the internauts could opt for a blanket license: nine identical
proposals asking for its implementation have been discussed in the parliamentary
debate26 of the HADOPI II Act, and again, they have been rejected by the
majority using, basically, the same arguments used to reject the OBL proposed
in the DADVSI Act 27.
A similar proposal has been raised by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) as a legitimating mechanism of a socially accepted Internet behavior
[63]. The Songwriters Association of Canada (SAC) promotes a proposal for
the monetization of the ﬁle sharing of music from the songwriter and recording
artists of Canada, i.e., a blanket license for ﬁle sharing. For this license, the
rightholders ask for the reform of the Copyright Act, in which a new reproduc-
tion right28, to obtain compensation for the reproduction of their works through
ﬁle sharing, will be recognized. Although a ﬁle-sharing license is proposed on
an optional basis, the fee will only be exempted if the Internet user agrees not
to perform ﬁle-sharing and, if caught, he agrees to pay a predetermined com-
pensation in damages.
These proposals have several common elements:
1. Existence of a collecting society for the distribution of the revenue.
2. ISPs will act as fee collecting entities.
3. Internet service subscribers will make a monthly payment of the license
fee.
4. Voluntary participation of creators, rightholders and Internet users.
5. Legalization of the exchange of cultural contents on the Internet.
Notwithstanding, there are voices like that of Birmingham City University An-
drew Dubber, who opposes this kind of licensing scheme arguing that it will
only solve the cash ﬂow of the major recording labels and that ISPs should not
be a police force and revenue collecting agency of the CPI29. With this in mind,
Harvard professor William Fisher has launched in Hong Kong a commercial
application called Noank30, which is based on his proposal for a global license
as an alternative compensation mechanism [30]. In it, the control, collection
and pricing strategies are managed centrally, using a client that can search for
and download the required contents. Right holders, by placing their works in
Noank, pick one of two types of licenses. In the ﬁrst scheme, reproduction and
distribution rights, as well as those that allow the creation of derivative works,
are licensed. In the second scheme, this last right is not licensed. The diﬀerence
between the two schemes leads to a reduction in licensing fees to the assigned
work for the owners who choose the latter.
26See http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/protection_penale_proplitt.
asp
27In http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cri/2008-2009-extra/20091027.asp.
28It is our opinion that more than a new right of reproduction, what they ask for is the
speciﬁcation of a particular way of reproduction of works subject to copyright rules.
29See http://www.musicthinktank.com/blog/the-blanket-license-debate.html
30See http://www.noankmedia.com/howitworks.html
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A diﬀerent kind of blanket license business model was launched in China
by Google [4], which shared advertisement revenues with its associates (the
four biggest recording labels plus many smaller ones) to oﬀer unlimited free
downloads from a catalog of more than one million songs. The objective of
this strategy was, from Google's side, to gain market share against Baidu, the
biggest search engine in China. From the CPI side, it is clear that the move was
aimed to help it increase the pyrrhic revenues obtained from the Chinese music
market (estimated as close to US$ 90 million). There are reports that Google
was using China as a testing bench to perfect the model and expand it to other
countries [31].
4.3.3. Private initiatives
Beyond the ﬁrst private initiatives that attempted to exploit the phenomenon
of ﬁle sharing through P2P networks, such as those of Napster [58] and Grokster
[56] that were deemed illegal and thus forced to close operations, the most suc-
cessful model for the provision of the digital cultural commons has been that
of YouTube31. Nontheless, by allowing its users to post any content they like,
YouTube was exposing itself to the same kind of argument that was used as
a beheading tool of both, Napster and Grokster, i.e., its liability to contribu-
tory copyright infringement as its application allowed the massive infringement
of copyrights by its users. As Driscoll [17] reﬂected, and later the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York stated [61], YouTube should
be granted safe harbor from the DMCA32 sanctions as its behavior was suf-
ﬁciently diﬀerent from that of both Napster and Grokster, taking down any
infringing content reported by copyright holders. Furthermore, YouTube has
established agreements with media giants in exchange of some part of the ad-
vertising revenues [12, 51, 62, 64], recently renewing with Warner Music despite
a long and particularly bitter process in which the media corporation removed
all its contents [10]. A deal has also been signed with the U.S. Government
that will allow federal agencies to post contents on Internet through YouTube's
service as well as other content providers and social networks [37].
Whether YouTube's business model has been successful is a diﬀerent story.
A report by Credit Suisse [52] originally estimating YouTube's operating losses
at $470 million, was later revised [53] to include the eﬀect of traﬃc peering,
reducing YouTube's traﬃc bill from $360 million to $300 million. RampRate
has challenged these ﬁgures, estimating operating losses of $174 million, by
31According to a study made by comScore, YouTube holds 41% of the online video market
share in the U.S. alone. In second place comes Fox Interactive media with only 3.1% [13].
32The Digital Millenium Copyright Act is the law that oversees the management of copy-
rights in the digital realm. It states the requirements that, for a particular type of activity,
a service or content provider needs to be granted safe harbor protection, a kind of exemption
to its users infringement. YouTube falls into the system storage safe harbor protection, as
it performs storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by the service [or content] provider, lacks actual knowledge of the
infrigement, and upon proper notice takes measures to remove or block the infringing content.
See 17 United States Code (U.S.C.) 512(c) .
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increasing the amount of traﬃc peered by YouTube, while adding cheaper non-
peered traﬃc due to direct deals with Tier 1 providers and better wholesale rates
due to Google's bulk purchasing power [47]. A more recent analysis carried out
by Citigroup's analyst Mark Mahaney has upped YouTube's revenue estimation
for 2011 to about $1.1 billion of which Google will keep $700 million. The high
variability in these ﬁgures comes from YouTube's secrecy, as any word would
mean a larger bill in revenue sharing with its media partners.
Independently of YouTube's ﬁnancial success, it has become what Gehl [32]
has deﬁned as a Wunderkammer or closet of wonders, a digital shelf waiting
either to overwhelm a visitor or to be utilized by savvy new entrepreneurs.
This shelf is ﬁlled with what its users deem should be saved for posterity, a
place where popularity have a diﬀerent meaning of the concept created by main-
strearm media. But YouTube goes beyond being a place of democratic storage
, it is also a showcase for the massive exhibition of these digital objects in such
a way that, without directly selling its product to the same people that keeps
it alive, a penny can be made on this heavy tailed repository33.
5. Internet access as a commons
5.1. Commons
By speaking of commons we refer to the ability of a group of people to
access a resource without someone from that group having the right or power to
exclude anyone else from using it [34]. In regard to whether the commons itself
takes place in an open access regime -without regulation- or in a limited access
regime -regulated- there is discussion generated from the argument raised by the
biologist Garret Hardin's warning of the unsustainability of common resources,
open to everyone, that he called the tragedy of the commons [33]. Hardin's
commons portray a resource that anybody can access without any restriction
to its use. His thesis, has been rebutted by many people who explain that
the metaphor used in the model confuses the commons resource with the open
access (res nullius) without restrictions34.
Regulations have not been limited to deﬁning who was allowed to access the
commons (it was restricted to commoners to whom the lord gave a use right).
The English commons limited the number of animals that villagers could feed
in the summer, as they could not exceed the number that could be fed in the
33YouTube's success has sprouted many competitors like Vimeo, Hulu and Vevo, the ﬁrst
one applying the democratic aspect of YouTube's storage while generating revenue through
ads as well as from power uploaders fees, and the last two allowing content only from the
media giants while getting their revenue from paying customers who want to access premium
content.
34Bollier argues that the pessimistic attitude regarding the sustainability of the commons is
maintained in part because the commons is frequently confused with an open-access regime, a
free-for-all in which a resource is essentially open to everyone without restriction.[8] According
to Capel [11], communal property has been misinterpreted many times and treated like a free
access resource without regulation. Bruce [9] explains that the commons, in the English
common law, implies a regulation in the form of access to the common resource.
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winter [15]. The capacity of the land was used to ﬁx a constraint on the use of
the commons.
Ellickson [18] considers that it is necessary to diﬀerentiate between an open
access resource, which everybody can use, and common property, where the
resource use is limited to the community. Under a pure or ideal state of open
access, each person is authorized to take out resource units, but no person or
group of persons have exclusive rights to manage or sell assets. By contrast,
the members under a regime of communal property, not only can enter and
remove units of the resource, but they also have rights to manage the resource
and exclude those who are not members of the community.
Finally, Munzer [41] thinks that the cause of the tragedy of the commons
lies in the absence of cooperation, not in the restriction of use, as community
members may agree in several ways on how the common resource should be
managed. This is what Elinor Ostrom [43, 45, 44] has shown in her research
about the sustainability of the commons.
Therefore, in this paper we will be using the term commons for a regulated
resource that is non-excludable, but it is rivalrous.
5.2. Internet layers
Yochai Benkler [6] sees the Internet as a communication system designed
under three interconnected layers that together make the Internet a commons:
the physical layer refers to both distribution channel as well as the devices to
produce and communicate the information. These devices are controlled by the
ISPs or by the Internet users. The logical layer includes the data transmission
standards and protocols, e.g. the set of protocols of the TCP/IP model that
since its inception was designed and used like a commons. And ﬁnally a content
layer that includes the cultural expressions that can be stocked and distributed
throughout the net, e.g. music, ﬁlms, books.
All these layers can be free or controlled [38]: they are free when they are
organized as a commons and everybody can access them under equal conditions,
and they are controlled when somebody has the right and the power to exclude
anyone from its use. At the same time one layer can be both free or controlled
like, for example, the content layer, in which we have cultural contents protected
by copyright rules and cultural contents under public domain or free access.
5.3. The open wireless networks as a commons
Several models have been presented on how wireless networks can be seen as
a commons. The most recent, but also the most ambitious, is the supercommons
theory laid down by Kevin Werbach [65], in which anyone is allowed to transmit
anywhere, anytime, and in any way, moving regulation from the spectrum
to the devices. This model focuses on the ineﬃciency of frequency allocation
regulations, and how networks that self allocate frequencies of a commons (e.g.
WiMAX), are much more eﬃcient. Benkler [5] referred to this physical layer
commons as open wireless networks.
From the point of view of Internet connectivity, an open wireless network
can be seen as a network of wireless access points that are, each one, connected
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to the Internet through their own link, which is contracted by some individual
or group, and that are open for use by other individuals. If the network is open
to everyone who wants to use its resources, it acts as a public good. On the
other hand, if the network is open only to members of a particular community,
then it will be a commons.
An open wireless network is susceptible to free riding, because many users
might be willing to use the resources available, but not to open their own access
points for the use of others. In [16], we can see that open networks are also
vulnerable to overgrazing (over exploitation of the resources), stealing (iden-
tity or resources thievery), poaching (blocking of some user's traﬃc to increase
one's own), tainting (spreading, unknowingly, viruses and worms to other users'
devices) and contamination (malicious reduction of the bandwidth available to
other users).
To guarantee the provision of the open network, one might think that a
commons, in which users that would like to tap the available resources are
required to provide their own Internet connected wireless access point, is a good
solution. But even if each access point is password protected and the passwords
are shared between the members of the commons, one or more commoners could
provide some of these passwords to family or friends, thus ensuring that the
commons' provision would be compromised. Solutions to the other problems
require the application of security measures on each user's computer, but, to
some extent, the vulnerability of the network is always present. Monitoring of
both, resources and users, might help the robustness of the network, but this
strategy would be no diﬀerent from the measures stated in the HADOPI.
A more complex variant of this kind of open wireless network is the model
of Benkler [6] in which access points will not only be open to traﬃc from any
user as the commoners decide, but also will have capabilities to search neigh-
boring networks, always securing the best route to send traﬃc. The ISPs under
this architecture would provide access to Internet through these wireless access
points, and the last mile should be provided by the cooperative action of the
Internet local users behaving as a commons. The presence of a commons in
the cooperative last mile throughout the proprietary broadband, removes the
bottleneck that ISPs set on last miles to control what is sent, to whom and with
what level of productivity and interactivity. Again, the network will be only as
open as the last mile commoners decide.
6. Conclusions
This paper complements our analysis in [69, 1, 2]. In [69] we have presented
an introduction to the interplay between legislation and information technology
that accompanied the developments of the Internet along with the possibilities
it opened for free access to copyrighted music and ﬁlms. We have have studied,
in particular, the various actors involved, their interests and the interactions
between the various actors. Economic modeling of these conﬂicts along with
that of alternative approaches for collaboration between actors was presented
in [2]. In this paper we presented the historical and ideological contexts of the
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conﬂicts that are due to the very wide access to culture and knowledge that the
Internet technology opens. We highlighted the central role that the access to
the Internet plays in what many countries understand as basic human rights.
We further summarized the economic identiﬁcation of the Internet with the
concept of public goods, and of the access to it as commons. Finally, in [1] we
have studied the impact that the so called sampling eﬀect and the CPI's legal
prosecution strategy carried out against random ﬁle sharers had have on sales,
pointing out that only attractive pricing schemes can tip ﬁle sharers' behavior
into that of regular customers.
Our main conclusion is that there is quite a consensus that the Internet is
a tool for the exercise of the freedom of speech and that the access to it is an
elementary right. This access, however, will have limitations when it comes into
conﬂict with other rights. At present there seems to be an agreement on what
such rights are. Yet, there is a strong debate on the way to guarantee those
rights, with the confrontational approach on the one hand, aiming at banning
physical access to copyrighted content on the Internet, and on the other hand
the approach aiming at taxing such access.
The future Internet will be very much inﬂuenced by the legal and economic
positions that nations adopt in the abovementioned debate. In particular, with
a confrontational approach winning, we may expect a shift from research on
P2P ﬁle sharing, towards research on identifying copyright infringers.
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